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1. INTRODUCTION
Russian outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) has expanded rapidly 
during the years 2000. The country has become the leading foreign inves-
tor among the BRIC countries (Figure 1), but the global crisis led to a spec-
tacular retreat since 2008. The rise of multinational companies from non-
triadic countries has attracted growing attraction in the recent period (see 
Goldstein, 2007 for a review), but the Russian case has been somewhat 
neglected, given the scale and the speed of the phenomenon. It is also 
highly original as far as the sectoral concentration of these FDI is concer-
ned. After the oil and gas sector, metallurgy is the second sector to parti-
cipate to this foreign expansion (Liuhto and Vahtra, 2007; Kalotay, 2008; 
Skolkovo, 2008).
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Russia benefits from a strong relative position in metal production. The 
United Company Rusal is the world’s largest producer of aluminium and 
alumina and Norilsk is the world’s leading producer of nickel and palla-
dium. Russia is also the fourth largest steel producer and exporter in the 
world, with four companies ranking among the top 30 of the industry 
in 2009. Between 2003 and 2008, most of these metallurgical companies 
acquired assets in both peripheral and core countries of the world eco-
nomy, for more than 30 billion USD.
This paper presents some stylized facts about the expansion of the Russian 
metallurgical firms. It describes the trajectory of internationalization 
of these firms and specifies its geographical and industrial orientations 
(horizontal, vertical upstream or downstream). This empirical research 
presents a very peculiar case. Indeed, Russian metal firms’ internationa-
lization occurred at a very rapid path since there were almost no foreign 
operations before the turn of the millennium. This process took place in 
an idiosyncratic domestic context resulting from the traumatic decade 
of post-soviet institutional transformations. Moreover, the global metal 
mining industry is a mature and highly oligopolistic industry. It has 
gone through a further process of concentration and vertical integration 
during the past two decades (UNCTAD, 2007) and benefited from a specta-
cular commodity boom in the mid 2000’s.
This specific internationalization path does not fit well with available 
theories. In order to address these shortcomings, we point to the need to 
better integrate the rise of non-triadic transnationals1 within the broa-
der literature on the determinants of firms’ internationalization and sug-
gest an exploratory institutional and systemic framework. The conceptual 
issues discussed throughout the paper are thus relevant beyond the limits 
of our case study.
The central point is the birth of transnational corporations, thus we focus 
on the firms level. We compiled data on the acquisitions of the main 
1 There is some confusion in the literature concerning the denomination of firms 
which operate internationally. We choose the concept of «transnationals» rather 
than «multinationals» in order to stress that such firms do not only operate in dif-
ferent markets but also organize internationally their different stages of production.
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metallurgists from the corporations and from business publications2. Our 
research also draws on an analysis of consolidated financial accounts 
published in the Osiris database under the so-called «global detailed for-
mat» of a sample of the top seven Russian metallurgical firms.
The second section presents the context and the various stages in the inter-
nationalization of the firms since the early nineties. It then describes the 
geographical and strategic direction of investments abroad. The third sec-
tion presents our institutional and systemic analytical framework and its 
theoretical background. The fourth section associates the stylized facts 
developed in section 2 to the conceptual framework. The concluding sec-
tion summarizes our empirical results and draws some conclusions of 
wider interest for theoretical debates on transnationals.
Figure 1. Outward foreign direct investments stocks – world share
Source: The authors based on UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics.
2 Companies’ websites : Evraz Group, http://www.evraz.com ; MMK…
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2. A FAVORABLE CONTEXT FOR  
THE INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT  
OF METALLURGICAL FIRMS
Two major developments supported the birth of Russian metallurgical 
transnational. First, exports were a leading factor in the reorganization of 
this sector during the nineties. Second, a very favorable economic environ-
ment has widely increased their financing capacities from 2003 to 2008.
Table 1 summarizes the characteristics of the main Russian metallurgical 
firms, accounting for most of the Russian production of steel, nickel and 
aluminium products.
2.1. The role of exports and the reorganization  
of the metallurgy in the post-soviet period
The internationalization of metallurgical firms occurred during the 
first years of the post-soviet transformation through the development 
of exports. The radical reforms implemented then led to a sharp drop in 
internal demand, a rise in atypical forms of payment and an acute level of 
uncertainty. These changes created strong incentives for the development 
of exports, which were made possible by the recent trade liberalization. 
Between 1992 and 1997, exports grew from 20 to 80 % of the production 
of non-ferrous metals and from 3 to 65 % of ferrous metals (Ekspert, 1998; 
Budanov, 1998). As a consequence, metallurgy was less affected than other 
sectors by the downturn in activity, leading to an increase in its weight in 
the Russian economy.
At the same time the industry went through a radical process of disloca-
tion of ownership structure. The privatization of almost all the enterprises 
between 1993 and 1995 delivered a fatal blow to the existing Soviet hierar-
chical relations (Appel, 1997; Durand, 2003 and 2004). Formally, the pro-
perty rights fell in the hand of companies’ managers. However, the effec-
tive control was in the hand of the trading company TransWorldGroup 
(TWG) which controlled the export channel, thanks to its links with the 
Eltsin’ administration. In 1995, TWG political supporters lost ground in 
the Kremlin. As a result, TWG lost the support of state representatives 
in board meeting and, consequently, the managers’ support. At the same 
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Tableau 1. The largest Russian metallurgical firms (2011)
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time, the « loan-for-shares » scheme allowed several Moscow-based banks 
to buy shares in the leading metallurgical companies at a hugely discounted 
price. In most cases, the banks supported the management against TWG. 
They helped them to strengthen their effective control by creating their 
own trade networks or by passing new agreements with foreign traders.
The distribution of property rights was seriously altered after the 1998 
financial crisis. On the one hand, banks rolled back because of the impact 
of the financial crisis. Moreover, metallurgical firms benefited from 
rising income stemming from devaluation. The changes in the economic 
context created new opportunities for top managers. They increased their 
shareholding in many companies and implemented a strategy of external 
growth. Moreover, new actors penetrated the industry such as Sibneft in 
the aluminium business.
Spectacular vertical and horizontal mergers occurred in the post-1998 
period: creation of Rusal and Sual aluminium groups, constitution of 
Evraz-Holding, reinforcement of industrial groups around the ferrous 
metallurgical combines of Magnitogorsk (MMK), Novolipetsk (NLMK) 
and Severstal. Two of the aims of this reorganization were to build ver-
tically integrated structures and to reinforce control over export chan-
nels. To that end, groups created their own commercial representations 
abroad and took stakes in transport infrastructure assets. Metallurgical 
groups also set out to secure their inputs through acquisitions of iron 
mines (Severstal, NLMK) or alumina plants and bauxite mines (SUAL, 
Rusal). Less significantly, some of them have also sought to expand to 
downstream industries: Severstal acquired and developed assets in the 
automotive industry, but assets acquired by Rusal in non-ferrous transfor-
ming mills were sold to Alcoa in 2004, as the company preferred to focus 
on its upstream strengths. The United Company Rusal was established 
in March 2007 following the merger of three companies: the two main 
players in the aluminium business in Russia – Rusal and SUAL – and the 
alumina assets of the Swiss Glencore.
2.2. 2003-2007: the golden years
Russia exports mainly basic metallurgical products. The competitiveness 
of these products is based on cheap energy and low labor costs, as well as 
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on the availability of natural resources (Budanov, 2008). However, metal-
lurgical firms have realized impressive financial performances since 
2003, thanks to the strong growth of domestic and international demands 
and higher prices.
2.2.1. Dynamic world markets
Since 2003, the situation on steel, aluminium and nickel markets has 
become extremely favorable because of a structural super-cycle in com-
modities (Figure 2). This super-cycle results from supply and demand fac-
tors. On the demand side, the key factor is the resource-intensive expan-
sion of BRIC countries, including population growth, the rise of the urban 
working class and fast industrialization. On the supply side, the industry 
has suffered from a number of bottlenecks, due to underinvestment and 
the long-term trend of deteriorating quality in mining projects (Troika 
Dialog, 2008).
As far as the steel industry is concerned, prices increased dramatically 
between autumn 2003 and 2004, contrasting with 20 years of stability. 
There was another huge but brief surge at the end of 2007. This drama-
tic evolution is only partly explained by the weakening of the US dollar. 
Growing demand, mainly from China, higher transportation and energy 
costs, strain on iron ore and almost-saturated production capacities are 
the main factors explaining the rise. Moreover, rising oil prices and a 
massive move of speculative funds on the commodities markets caused the 
spectacular rise of 2007-2008. This shift has been abruptly reversed by the 
global downturn, but steel prices are still significantly higher than before 
2003. Nickel prices followed a similar dramatic evolution, although most 
of the rise occurred in 2006 and the fall began in early 2007.
Aluminium prices also rose substantially between 2003 and 2006, mostly 
for the same reasons as in the case of steel products. Here again, there was 
a dramatic reversal in 2008 that wrote off all the gains accumulated since 
2003. Although China’s role was crucial as well, it was in a quite different 
manner than in the steel industry. Mounting over-production capacities 
in China have driven prices down in the post-crisis period toward their 
level at the beginning of 200s.
TOO BIG, TOO QUICK?
R E V U E D’ÉC O N O MIE IND U S T R IE L L E ➻  N ° 14 2  ➻  2 E T R IME S T R E 2 01348
During this period of high prices there were numerous mergers and acqui-
sitions within the steel and the aluminium industries, as illustrated by 
the takeover bid of Mittal on Arcelor, numerous acquisitions by Alcan and 
the creation of Rusal.
Figure 2. Steel aluminium and nickel world prices  
(index based on USD/ton prices)
Source: The authors based on Reuters/EcoWin.
2.2.2. Outstanding cash-flow for the metallurgists
As the share of foreign sales is very important – from 45 to 93 % depen-
ding on the firm, the enterprises have fully benefited from world growth. 
Moreover, the internal market expanded fast as well. However, the disrup-
tion of 2008-2009 was a tremendous shock.
Thus, we firstly observe a spectacular rise in the sales of the main compa-
nies (Figure 3). In dollars the rise is astronomic for all the firms. The least 
impressive figures are those of MMK and NLMK, for which we observe a 
fourfold increase between 2002 and 2007. The change is even more impres-
sive for the others firms, which were more involved in M&A operations: 
the revenues of Norilsk, Rusal, Evraz and Severstal grew by about 700 % 
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over the period! The shock of the crisis was huge for all firms; however 
their total revenue began to recover in 2010.
Figure 3. Evolution of total revenue of main firms (2002-2011)
Source: The authors based on Osiris database and companies’ reports.
This exceptional increase in gross sales generated financial results that 
are no less impressive. All their profit margins were significantly higher 
at the end of the period (Figure 4). The best performers were Norilsk and 
NLMK with an average profit margin of 40 %, while the ratio was «only» 
about 20 % for the others. In value terms, the evolution is no less specta-
cular (figure 5): the net profits of the firms, in USD, increased between 7 
and 20 times over the period.
It would be inaccurate to explain this surge in profitability in terms of 
changes in world markets only. According to their annual reports, firms 
modernized their production tools, increased labor productivity, increased 
their production assortment, improved their quality levels and commer-
cial channels and increased economies of scale. Moreover, the weakening 
of the dollar should also be taken into account. However, the evolution of 
prices as well as the strength of Russian and international demands are 
still the decisive explanatory factors of the performances of these firms, 
which is particularly clear when one considers the very strong negative 
impact of the global crisis on their profits and margins.
TOO BIG, TOO QUICK?
R E V U E D’ÉC O N O MIE IND U S T R IE L L E ➻  N ° 14 2  ➻  2 E T R IME S T R E 2 01350
Figure 4. Evolution of profit margin (2002-2011)
Source: The authors based on Osiris database, companies’ reports.
Figure 5. Evolution of net profit (2002-2011)
Source: The authors based on Osiris database and companies’ reports.
The rise of exports during the nineties allowed metallurgical firms to 
avoid a complete production collapse. This internationalization of the sec-
tor is also the main reason of the producers’ high profitability since 2003, 
thanks to a very favorable international conjuncture. In this context, 
metallurgical firms have also been able to obtain international funding. 
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Some of them have been listed in London, New York and Hong-Kong 
(Norilsk, NLMK, Evraz, Severstal, Rusal) and most of them have obtained 
syndicated loans, involving famous international investment banks, for 
their foreign acquisitions.
World markets are not only an opportunity for growth for Russian firms. 
They are more and more exposed to foreign economic downturns and they 
must be able to face world competitors on specific grounds such as prices, 
quality and access to strategic inputs. This exposure to world competition 
constitutes a set of constraints that shape the geographical and strategic 
orientation of their foreign investments.
2.3. Geography and strategy of metallurgists’ foreign 
investments
What is the orientation of foreign investments by metallurgical firms? Based 
on information published by the press and by companies, we have compiled 
data on foreign acquisitions. This synthetic view is given in Figure 7. In addi-
tion to the firms presented in Table 1, the acquisitions of two smaller firms are 
included: TMK, a steel pipe producer, and Metallo-Invest, whose accounts are 
not publicly available. Among the main Russian metallurgical firms, MMK 
is the only one which has not expanded abroad, in spite of several attempts.
Figure 6. Amount of foreign acquisitions  
by Russian metallurgical firms (2000-2011)
Source: The authors based on business publications and companies’ reports.
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The data allow us to make two observations. Firstly, the productive inter-
nationalization of Russian metallurgy barely existed up until 2003 and has 
dramatically increased since then. Secondly, foreign operations of Russian 
metallurgists are not restricted to Central Europe and the CIS countries. 
On the contrary, they mainly target the core markets of the world eco-
nomy (North America and the European Union), southern countries (Latin 
America, Africa, Oceania) where important mineral deposits are located 
and, to a lesser extent, China (Tables 2 and 3). Indeed, non-ferrous metal-
lurgical groups, as well as Severstal – which is building a gold mining 
business –, have sought to access to mineral inputs in peripheral countries 
of the world economy. The main operations in industrialized countries 
have been linked to the 2007 creation of UC Rusal, which has allowed the 
Russian aluminium leader to take control of Glencore’s alumina and alu-
minium assets in Ireland, Italy, Sweden and Jamaica.
Ferrous metallurgical companies have more clearly sought access to core 
markets in Western Europe and North America, with the most notable 
exception of Evraz which has acquired steel production facilities in China 
and South Africa in 2006, 2007 and 2008 for more than 2 billion USD.
These two paths of international development are grounded on very dif-
ferent industry dynamics. Access to inputs appears to be less critical for the 
steel industry than for non-ferrous metallurgy and gold mining. Indeed, 
most of the investments of Norilsk and Rusal aimed at gaining access to 
raw materials. In the case of the rapidly expanding aluminium industry, 
the supply of bauxite was perceived as being the main point of tension. 
With the exception of the Glencore’s deal, most of the investments in the 
EU and North America were also oriented upward.
Most Russian steel makers already stabilized their supply chains through 
the acquisition of iron ore and steel coal mines. The motive for productive 
internationalization therefore lies elsewhere. Russian metallurgists were 
affected by antidumping procedures in the nineties; since then tariffs and 
quotas restricted their imports in the EU and the US. One of the main 
strategic problems for them was thus to stabilize their access to markets 
over the medium and long term. The acquisitions of metallurgical firms 
in Europe and the US provided an opportunity to overcome this diffi-
culty. The amplitude of the investments were very significant: Russian 
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companies, led by Severstal and Evraz Group, accumulated 9.1 percent of 
the steel capacity in the United States, according to a 2008 Reuters calcu-
lation from data supplied by London-based consultancy CRU.
Tableau 2. Amount (and number) of foreign acquisitions by region  
and orientation - ferrous metallurgy (2000-2011 – millions USD)
CIS AND CENTRAL 
EUROPE
UE AND NORTH 
AMERICA
REST OF THE 
WORLD
MINING 1000 (1) 698 (1) 37,5 (1)
PROCESSING 1056 (8) 12975 (21) 2457(4)
DOWNSTREAM 100 (1)
Source: The authors based on business publications and companies’ reports.
Tableau 3. Amount (and number) of foreign acquisitions by region  
and industrial orientation - non-ferrous metallurgy (2000-2011)
CIS AND CENTRAL 
EUROPE
UE AND NORTH 
AMERICA
REST OF THE 
WORLD
UPSTREAM 328 (1) 290 (1) 9010 (8)
PROCESSING 283 (5) 4020 (2) 290 (3)
DOWNSTREAM
Source: The authors based on business publications and companies’ reports.
The lack of market-led investment in the global south – with the excep-
tions of two cathode plants acquired by Rusal in China and some more 
significant investments by Evraz – may seem surprising. Although fur-
ther explanations are required on this issue, one can stress that market-
led investments in Europe and in the US often involve loss-making firms, 
whereas there is a lack of such opportunities in fast-growing developing 
countries.
To conclude this section, we may stress that the internationalization of 
metallurgical firms is a massive but heterogeneous phenomenon. We 
observe two main strategies: resource-seeking in the non-ferrous metal-
lurgy sector and market-seeking in the ferrous metallurgy sector, which 
reflect the respective market specificities of these industries. However, 
market-seeking strategies in western countries have been abruptly rever-
sed by the crisis. Since then, debt trapped Russian companies have almost 
completely stopped foreign expansion. Several firms have adopted a divest-
ment strategy in non-core assets, including the sale of significant assets in 
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the US and in Europe by Severstal and by Mechel. However, projects of fur-
ther expansion in India are still considered by Severstal, suggesting that a 
possible next stage of Russian internationalization – when Russian metal-
lurgists will have recovered from the crisis – may be oriented toward emer-
ging markets, where demand growth has outpaced expansion elsewhere.
3. AN INSTITUTIONAL AND SYSTEMIC APPROACH 
TO CORPORATE INTERNATIONALIZATION
The emergence of new transnationals from developing and transition eco-
nomies has led to a renewal of the theoretical thinking about firms’ inter-
nationalization. Our case study points out some shortcomings of the recent 
literature, which lead us to suggest a new analytical framework.
3.1. Theoretical issues raised by the emergence  
of non-triadic transnationals
Transnational corporations are such specific and complex organizations 
that the most influential framework in this field has been called the eclectic 
paradigm (Dunning, 1993 and 2000; Dunning and Lundan, 2008). The eclec-
tic paradigm articulates different theoretical tools and it suggests that the 
mode and level of internationalization result from the combination of three 
main forces: the specific advantage of the firm (Ownership), the advantage 
of localizing abroad in some specific country (L) and the advantage of inter-
nalizing transactions within the firm (I). This eclectic approach is so large 
that it has been criticized for being more a taxonomy than a real theoreti-
cal framework (Ietto-Gillies, 2007), but also for being focused solely on the 
interest of the private firms (Andreff, 2003). Moreover, it is completely dis-
connected from the macro-economic environment.
The «investment development path» (IDP) perspective is an additional deve-
lopment of the eclectic paradigm which links the dynamic of foreign invest-
ment with the economic development of nations (Dunning and Narola, 
1996). It represents a significant improvement of the paradigm, as it allows 
conceptualizing the expansion of transnationals beyond the micro analy-
sis and it has received some empirical corroboration (Andreff, 2003; Duran 
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and Ubeda, 2001). However, it is very hard to establish a simple relationship 
between gross domestic product per capita and foreign investment pat-
terns; for example, contemporary Russia with a ratio of outward to inward 
stocks of about 0.8 in 2007 appears to be a premature outward investor 
from the IDP perspective (Kalotay, 2008). As a matter of fact, countries are 
highly idiosyncratic: “different countries at similar levels of income may 
have very different patterns of ownership advantages in activities that go 
multinational, depending on their initial conditions and government stra-
tegies as well as accident of history” (Lall, 1996, p. 424). Moreover, the IDP 
needs to be considered alongside with the transformation of the interna-
tional regime. Therefore, recent empirical researches suggest that globali-
zation – through increased competition and opportunities, fueled “a secu-
lar shift in the link between development stages and internationalization, 
so that TNCs from developing and transition economies are increasingly 
investing at an earlier stage in their development” (UNCTAD, 2006).
In addition to this insightful but problematic hypothesis of a linear pat-
tern of FDI for every country, the rising literature about non-triadic trans-
nationals has pointed out a new range of assumptions. A first hypothesis 
suggests a progressive pattern of internationalization: established transna-
tionals continued to dominate knowledge and brand-intensive businesses, 
whereas companies from developing countries hold an advantage in indus-
tries where production and logistics matters (Ghemawat and Hout, 2008; 
UNCTAD, 2006). Our case study is consistent with this hypothesis as the 
foreign expansion of Russian firms from the mining and metal industries 
is linked to a geographically bound access to natural resources.
A second set of explanation follows Vernon’s (1979) argument which pointed 
out that transnationals would start by locating in familiar economies and 
only at a later stage they will spread to less familiar locations. The contem-
porary debates has focused on institutional affinity, suggesting that deve-
loping-country transnationals are able to transform the disadvantages 
of their weak domestic institutional background into advantages as they 
expand in other developing countries with the same characteristics (Vora 
and Kostova, 2007; Cuervo-Cazurra and Mehmet Genc, 2008). The interna-
tionalization pattern of Russian metallurgists is not fully consistent with 
this assumption as they have expanded in neighboring economies in tran-
sition but also in remote developing and developed countries.
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Finally, it is generally supposed that there is a positive impact of outward FDI 
on the home economy which arises from the improvement of transnationals 
competitiveness (UNCTAD, 2006), although there may be crowding out effect 
on domestic investment (Dunning and Lundan, 2008). This last issue may be 
one of the aspects of the vulnerability of the metallurgical firms in particu-
lar and of the Russian economy more generally which results from an exces-
sively outward economic orientation (Drahokoupil and Myant, 2010).
Further theoretical developments are needed, firstly because of the inner 
limits of the OLI paradigm and of its macro additional component, the 
IDP theory. Moreover, our case study point out inconsistencies of these 
theoretical hypotheses in front of the rise of non-triadic transnationals. 
The exploratory institutional and systemic approach, presented in the 
following section aims at integrating the peculiar case of transnationals 
from developing countries – and in particular Russian Metallurgical firms 
– within a more general theoretical framework.
3.2. An institutional and systemic analytical framework
Figure 9 presents our institutional and systemic approach of firms’ inter-
nationalization. We mobilize various set of literature in order to articulate 
the macro- and meso-context to the microeconomic competitive strategies 
on which underlying foreign investment decisions are based. Moreover, 
we link these decisions to firms’ ability to pursue growth. Three interde-
pendent dimensions of the internationalization paths of the firm are thus 
combined: factors related to company growth, macro-meso institutional 
and economic features, and micro-economic strategies.
Block 1 presents two factors related to company growth. First, internatio-
nalization is conditioned by the firm’s capacity to grow: the availability of 
financial or managerial resources pushes the firm to expand. Second, the 
growth is guided by some specific advantage (or “ownership advantage”, in 
the OLI perspective) that exerts a pull pressure in some directions, which 
may entail the option of international expansion of the same business. 
This suggests that at the firm/sector level the process of capital accumu-
lation is to some extent path-dependent, in other words it is embedded in 
specific organizational forms, and deploying the same process in other 
fields entails some additional costs.
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Block 2 is about the meso- and macro-determinants of the orientation 
and modalities of international expansion. It includes determinants deri-
ving from the demand-led explanation exposed below, from national cha-
racteristics in terms of size and factor endowment (for both the host-eco-
nomy and the country of origin). Moreover, it appears highly relevant to 
explore a combination of two schools of thoughts that are usually presented 
as antagonistic – but not always (Noelke and Vliegenthart, 2009): on the 
one hand, the diversity of national capitalisms (Amable, 2005; Berger and 
Dore, 1996; Boyer and Hollingsworth, 1989; Dore, 2000; Hall and Soskice, 
2001; Jacoby, 2005; Whitley, 1999) and, on the other hand, the world system 
perspective, which focuses on the integration of national economies wit-
hin a hierarchical capitalist world system (Michalet, 1998; Chesnais, 1997; 
Wallerstein, 2002). Indeed, the international expansion trajectories of firms 
are obviously affected, and to some extent motivated, by the heterogeneity 
of countries. But, at the same time, as firms occupy specific positions in the 
global value chains, they shape the meso-foundations of an interdependent 
and hierarchical world system (Gereffi and Korzeniewicz, 1994).
Figure 7. An institutional and systemic perspective  
on corporate internationalization
Source: The authors.
The microeconomic strategies summed up in block 3 can be considered 
as the set of responses available for managers facing the constraints and 
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opportunities stemming from the economic and institutional context 
(block 2) and from the past trajectory of the firm (block 1).
3.2.1. Path-dependent growth of the firm
The theory of the growth of the firm (Penrose, 1959) considers the com-
pany as a centre of resources that has to grow or die. These resources may 
be financial but are mainly, in the mind of Penrose, managerial resources. 
Her analysis is then somewhat precursor of the evolutionist concept of 
collective knowledge (Nelson and Winter, 1982). These resources contribute 
to a specific advantage made of intangible assets (Hortsman and Markusen, 
1989) or related to localization (geographical situation and institutional 
context). This specific advantage orientates the growth of the firm.
Depending on its resources and opportunities, the company has three 
options for growth (Wolf, 1977; Kay, 2000): 1/ Growing in its own business 
and in its own country; 2/ diversifying its activities while staying in its 
own country; 3/ diversifying its activities geographically by exporting or 
expanding its business abroad. The internationalization option and espe-
cially that of creating a transnational corporation is the most difficult. 
Indeed, many different factors make it more complicated and expensive to 
operate abroad. However, in core industries (Crotty, 2000), the process of 
capital accumulation is deeply embedded in a specific sector. First, as the 
production process is not subject to the law of diminishing returns, there 
are strong incentives to increase the scale of operations, possibly through 
internationalization. Moreover, as the assets of the firms are significantly 
immobile, irreversible or specific, they lose substantial value if reallocated 
to a different industry or sold on a second hand market. As a consequence 
of these sunk costs, there are strong incentives to acquire complementary 
assets - possibly abroad – insofar as they may positively affect the valua-
tion of the firm.
In such a perspective we have firstly to identify the resources which have 
fuelled the foreign expansion of Russian metallurgist and, secondly, we 
need to discuss if this expansion has increased the value of firms’ domes-
tic assets.
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3.2.2. Macro-meso constraints and opportunities
With the concept of all weather company, Pitelis has suggested an origi-
nal macroeconomic approach based on the demand side. He indicates the 
desire of firms to protect themselves against national economic cycles 
while diversifying geographically (Pitelis, 2000). This argument allows 
enlarging the relevance of demand-led explanations but cannot explain 
why internationalization involves foreign investment and not just exports.
In addition to macro factors, there is also a complex sectoral and institu-
tional web of constraints and opportunities.
The Global Production Networks (GPNs) approach (Henderson et al., 2002) 
points out that “GPNs do not only connect firms functionally and terri-
torially but also they connect aspect of social and spatial arrangements 
in which those firms are embedded and which influence their strategies 
and the values, priorities and expectations of managers, workers and com-
munities alike”. There are two main forms of this embeddedness. Firstly, 
territorial embeddedness, whereby GPNs do not merely locate in particu-
lar places but absorb characteristics of these places and are constrained 
by them. Secondly, network embeddedness, which refers to the mutual 
dependence of the firms with regard to the architecture and institutional 
configuration of the networks. Concerning transnationals, Kostova et al. 
(2008) stress rightly that “the multiplicity and ambiguity of the organiza-
tional fields at the meso level result in more diverse but weaker institutio-
nal pressure for MNCs overall. [...] They are in a way buffered, protected, 
less dependent, and in some cases perhaps even exempt from institutio-
nal pressure because of their unique an complex positioning in the web 
of organizational sectors” (p. 998). Nonetheless, institutional characteris-
tics of networks and territories are not only constraints for firms but also 
resources. They constitute institutional configurations which may evolve 
significantly not only endogenously but also through interplay between 
certain corporate leaders and political figures.
The peculiarity of the Russian post-soviet institutional context is essential 
to understand Russian firms’ behavior. In particular, we need to explore the 
local and global institutional features which have favored the internationali-
zation of metallurgists as a further step of their growth, and to what extent 
the foreign expansion was an attempt to escape from weak property rights.
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3.2.3. Microeconomic strategies
The importance of the political design of institutional productive confi-
guration has been particularly clearly exposed for the development path 
of newly industrialized East Asian countries, but also for countries like 
Japan and France in the post-WWII period (Tylecote, Visintin, 2007; 
Johnson, 1995; Amsden, 1989; Wade, 1990; Jessop and Sum, 2006). Firms 
are then not only institution takers but also institution makers, which means 
that improving their positions within private-public networks could be a 
major source of competitive advantages. But at the same time, their inter-
national strategies may be partially shaped to satisfy the requirements of 
their political allies, suggesting a two-way relationship between interna-
tionalization and private-public network embeddedness.
The literature has underscored that the issue of private-public networks is 
of particular relevance in the Russian post-Soviet context. “Znakomstva I 
Svyazi” (acquaintances and connections) have played a key role to regu-
larize the disruptions in the soviet planning process (Rehn and Taalas, 
2004). Such informal institutions still occupied a prominent place in the 
nineties when barter’s networks were used to face the hardening of mone-
tary conditions in a context of radical uncertainty (Huber and Wörgötter, 
1998; Ould-Ahmed, 2003) and appeared to be long a lasting feature of post-
communist economies (Puffer, McCarthy and Boisot, 2009). This pheno-
menon is probably even greater in sector highly concentrated such as the 
metallurgy where business-State relations take the form of direct connec-
tions between political personal and business leaders rather than formal 
relations through business associations (Duvanova, 2011).
More generally, these networks appear to be a dominant form of coordi-
nation in Russia because of (i) the weak legitimacy of property rights, (ii) 
the size and importance of the industrial base inherited from the Soviet 
Union, from both the social and the strategic points of view and (iii) the 
possibility of providing support by centralizing and redistributing huge 
rents from extractive industries (Durand and Petrovski, 2008). These 
networks are all the more important in the exporting sectors as federal 
policies on international integration and energy directly affect the com-
petitiveness and profit prospects of these companies. In this context, the 
objective of firms’ network and institutional design strategies is to build a 
favorable environment for their international activities.
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However, the literature also stresses some intrinsic motives for internatio-
nalization: the firms may be seeking market power, techno-competitive 
advantage or efficiency gains. In addition to the gains from increasing 
scales of operation (Vernon, 1966; Crotty, 2000), market power analysis 
shows a trend towards the elimination of conflict between main firms 
as a result of the growth and behavior of transnational corporations 
(Hymer, 1976; Caves, 1971; Sweezy and Magdoff, 1974; Palloix, 1975; Cowling 
and Sugden, 1987; Graham, 1978). Within the global value chain analy-
sis (Gereffi and Korzeniewicz, 1994; Gereffi and Kaplinsky, 2001; Gereffi, 
Humphrey and Sturgeon, 2005; Bair, 2005) growing market power, as sel-
ler or buyer, allows the firm to strengthen its bargaining power and thus 
improve its financial results.
The literature also suggests that the encounter between the domestic way 
of producing and innovating and new market conditions favors innova-
tion (Cantwell, 1995; Dunning and Wymbs, 1999). In the case of transna-
tionals from developing countries, it is supposed that the integration in 
global production network should foster economic upgrading. A successful 
path, exemplify by Korean transnationals in the US (Miotti and Sachwald, 
2001), result from technological and know-how spillovers as firms invest 
or operate in more advanced economies.
Finally, the literature on the strategy of seeking efficiency gains focuses 
mainly on lowering labor costs and taxation, in particular through a divide 
and rule mechanism (Marglin, 1974; Bowles, 1985; Peoples and Sudgen, 2000; 
Crotty, Epstein and Kelly, 1998). Labour costs are not the main issue in 
capital intensive industries such as metal and mining industries. However 
the firms’ ability to increase their bargaining power vis-à-vis local com-
munities and their national State is a relevant issue. Corporations can use 
different kinds of threat related to their control over production chains 
to obtain favorable changes in social, ecological, fiscal and monetary rules 
or to gain some support from the state for its international development. 
Firms sometimes extort advantages from local authorities when they look 
for a site to locate their activities. The ability of firms to build strategies 
of tax optimization by using transfer prices mechanisms internal prices 
(Saint-Etienne, Le Cacheux et al. 2005) is a key-advantage of transnatio-
nals. These organizations are thus partially emancipated from the social 
and political constraints linked to territorialization (Andreff, 1996), what 
Kostova et al. (2008) called the “institutional pressure”.
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Russian metallurgist’s investments dedicated to the acquisition of firms 
based near key markets in developed economies, and the extensive reliance 
on international schemes of tax avoidance fits with the variety of strate-
gies of FDI pointed out in the literature in term of market power, techno-
competitive advantage or efficiency gains. However, the importance of the 
public-private networks as key drivers of firm’s internationalization has 
been insufficiently taken into account, yet.
4. DETERMINANTS OF THE 
INTERNATIONALIZATION OF RUSSIAN 
METALLURGICAL FIRMS
4.1. Path dependent growth: an accelerated 
international expansion fueled by a short-term 
surplus of financial resources
The international expansion of metallurgical firms is a path-dependent 
process. It follows a decade of adaptation to foreign markets through 
exports. Moreover, it has been preceded by a wave of consolidation of the 
internal market, allowing managerial teams to expand and acquire new 
kinds of skills to manage multi-company groups.
The surges in firms’ revenues and the rise of foreign investments have 
been simultaneous. In addition to huge profits, access to world financial 
systems has provided metallurgical firms with financing capacities from 
international investment banks, giving them a new capacity of acqui-
sition. As a result, there has been a spectacular surge in the long-term 
debt of the major firms, especially to fund acquisitions in 2007 and 2008 
(Figure 10).
Not surprisingly, these elements confirm the relationship between the 
availability of financial resources and the growth of the firm. The cancel-
lation of the 3.5 billion USD acquisition of U.S. John Maneely by NLMK in 
November 2008 as a consequence of the global crisis is a negative confir-
mation of this link.
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However, this relationship does not explain why firms expand abroad 
instead of expanding domestically - in the same business or through diver-
sification -, nor why they choose to invest abroad instead of expanding 
exports. Part of the explanation lies in the Penrosean view of the growth 
of the firms; as resources are firm-specific, in particular managerial 
resources, there are some advantages to expanding in the same business 
instead of diversifying. It is also worth noting that some acquisitions are 
made with the aim of stabilizing existing production chains, like Rusal’s 
acquisition of an alumina plant in Ukraine and a number of bauxite mines 
in Guinea that were already supplying Soviet smelters.
Beyond this tendency to grow along a dependent path, other determinants 
of the modes and direction of expansion are related to the set of macro/
meso constraints and opportunities.
Figure 8. Evolution of total debt (2002-2011)
Source: The authors based on companies’ reports.
4.2. An international expansion shaped by a specific 
set of macro/meso constraints and opportunities
The first stages of internationalization through exports during the early 
phase of the transition resulted from the disorganization of industrial rela-
tionships and the monetary disorders (demonetization, liquidity crunch) 
that led to a sharp fall in domestic demand. Exports enabled firms to 
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maintain their activities and to limit the destruction of both physical and 
managerial production capacities inherited from the Soviet era. They also 
helped to prevent potential social troubles by limiting unemployment in 
mono-industrial cities. This evolution was made possible by the radical 
post-Soviet institutional transformation, in particular the liberalization 
of foreign trade and capital flows (Vercueil, 2002) and it was favored by 
trade and financial liberalization.
However, numerous conflicts about alleged dumping practices arose 
between Russia and Western countries, increasing uncertainty about 
export demand. Thus, the acquisition of foreign affiliates can be seen as a 
means to reduce such uncertainty – a move that can be interpreted in the 
light of Pitelis’s all weather company hypothesis – and to secure its foreign 
outlets.
The international expansion of Russian metallurgical firms took place wit-
hin a core-periphery world system structuring of economic relationships 
(Wallerstein, 1994). Indeed, Russian investments are directed towards, 
on the one hand, Southern countries because of their mineral resources 
and, on the other hand, developed countries with huge consumer markets. 
However, Russian firms managed to expand abroad largely because of the 
cost advantage they derived from the natural resources endowment of the 
country (low energy costs and raw materials), and this expansion does not 
conflict with a deepening of the specialization on low-range industrial 
products of the Russian economy.
Finally, the specificity of the domestic Russian competition regime also 
created an incentive for horizontal foreign expansion in the steel industry 
in the place of domestic investment and expanding exports. Indeed, as 
Gaddy (2007) argues, consumption goods markets are fairly competitive in 
Russia, whilst investment goods markets are relatively closed, resulting in 
a sort of «mark-up» when investing in fixed capital. Consequently, spen-
ding the same amount on investment in Russia does not yield the same 
results compared to a country where investment goods markets are more 
open.
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4.3. Microeconomic strategies: improving the firm’s 
position within global chains and securing asset 
ownership
Metallurgical firms act to improve their positions within global value 
chains and in the face of international competition. Such an objective 
means that they have to secure their supplies, protect their outlets for 
trade and improve transactional conditions. At the same time, some opera-
tions also aim to gain techno-competitive advantages from joint-ventures 
or from proximity to leading customers.
According to transaction costs theory, when asset specificity leads to cap-
tive relationships, firms choose to internalize transactions (Coase, 1937; 
Williamson, 1985; Pitelis, 1993; Hennart, 2000). The aim of foreign acqui-
sitions is then to transform the governance structure of value chains 
(Humphrey and Schmitz, 2001; Gereffi, Humphrey and Sturgeon, 2005). 
Investments in bauxite mines, alumina plants or Russian transportation 
infrastructure and commercial representations abroad are indicative of 
such logic. In return, investments in the European Union and in North 
America are related to structural market failures analyzed in early studies 
on internalization within transnational corporations (Hymer, 1976; Caves, 
1971), as a means to reduce the adverse consequences of commercial restric-
tions such as anti-dumping procedures and quotas.
Market-power seeking is an explicit strategy of metallurgists. For example, 
in its strategic orientations, Evrazholding underlines the benefits deriving 
from its leading position in terms of negotiation power vis-à-vis its sup-
pliers. Severstal is even more direct (Annual report, 2003, p. 33): “One of 
Severstal’s key strategic aims is to become a leading participant in the 
global steel market. To achieve this, Severstal intends to actively partici-
pate in consolidation, both in Russia and internationally. Consolidation in 
the world steel industry is expected to change the current balance, whe-
reby suppliers of raw materials (such as coal and iron ore) and the largest 
consumers of steel products (such as the automotive industry), are able to 
obtain higher margins for their products than are the steel producers, as 
their respective industry are substantially more concentrated than the 
steel industry.”
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Metallurgists experienced another way of improving their position while 
internationalizing: to acquire techno-competitive skills. To increase their 
prices, they have to diversify their production. Such an improvement 
implies a better understanding of markets and customer expectations, 
and internationalization helps to provide this. Indeed, acquiring firms 
in more advanced economies and investing in joint ventures close to lea-
ding world customers favors access to advanced productive knowledge. 
Severstal’s investments close to existing car plants in the United States do 
illustrate this strategy. Rusal’s partnership with the main aluminium pro-
ducers in the alumina plants in Queensland is also a way to acquire the 
newest technological know-how. However, Russian firms also use other 
means to acquire new technologies and skills, by modernizing their pro-
duction apparatus, training, setting up joint ventures in Russia (Severstal-
Arcelor) or recruiting senior Western managers and board-members 
(Rusal, Severstal, NLMK, Evraz).
The link between State policies and corporate expansion is a key issue. 
These firms are not global transnationals (Andreff, 2003), because of 
their dependency on mineral raw materials and of the prohibitive sunk 
costs of leaving their mills. However, transnationals may develop divide 
and rule strategies against governments, for example, by optimizing taxa-
tion. Basically, they may use the threat of relocation to increase their 
bargaining power and obtain additional support for their activity or for 
their expansion abroad. The tax evasion issue is particularly relevant 
for Russian firms, notably in the aluminium industry where the tolling 
scheme was used in the nineties and where the long term sales’ contracts 
between Rusal and Glencore were contested by minority shareholders in 
2012. Rusal’s tax evasion through illegal transfer pricing is well known; in 
2004, an internal report of the tax ministry pointed out that Rusal’s tax 
payments in 2003 were just 2 % of its official sales revenue, a fraction of 
what other metal producers paid.
Clearly, internationalization reinforces firms’ bargaining power against 
governments. However, this bargaining power is not without limits. 
Transnationals usually request the support of their national government 
for their expansion abroad (Chesnais, 1997; Michalet, 2004). It is even 
more essential in an industry such as metallurgy, where localization is a 
crucial issue because of the reliance on natural resources and the size of 
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irreversible investments. In the Russian case too, the cooperation between 
business and foreign policy is vital for both the firms and the govern-
ment. For example, according to the press, the failed merger proposed by 
senior managers of Arcelor and Severstal was primarily discussed directly 
between president Putin and Severstal’s CEO, Alexei Mordashov. Moreover, 
Russian metallurgists request political support in order to preserve social 
peace. National corporatism in the Russian metallurgical industry may 
thus not be dissociated from the political and economic framework of inter-
nationalization. Finally, the stability of property rights is still a hot issue 
in Russia, because the illegitimacy of the privatization process during the 
nineties (Wedel, 1998) makes reconsideration of these operations still pos-
sible. The Khodorkovski case and the takeover of important assets through 
the re-development of the state as producer indicate that the government 
does sometimes act in this direction; the pretext of violations of the regu-
lation has been frequently used (Durand, 2008). Metallurgical firms are 
indeed exposed to this kind of pursuit: in July 2008, Mechel and Evraz 
were scrutinized by the Federal Antimonopoly Service for abusing their 
dominant positions on the market. In the midst of the crisis, the state 
has also taken control over certain key assets. After it granted a $4.5bn 
bail-out loan to Rusal at the end of 2008 and a $1.8bn loan to Interros 
– one of Norilsk main shareholders – a state representative, Alexander 
Voloshin, the former Kremlin chief of staff, was appointed as chairman of 
the board of Norilsk, while another VEB (a state-controlled bank) repre-
sentative moved onto its board and the first deputy head of VEB moved 
onto Rusal’s board. After January 2009, the State’s priority has been to 
prevent bankruptcies and ownership upheavals that might worsen short-
term economic and social disorder. The government urged public banks 
to roll over loans. As far as foreign banks are concerned, the State has 
modified its attitude, but none of the banks wants to take over the assets 
pledged as collateral for the loans and they preferred to restructure debts 
rather than to have to cope with uncertain default procedures. Moreover, 
negotiations were eased by the rebound in commodity prices, leading to 
several agreements between international banks and Russian companies, 
including Rusal and Mechel. For example Evraz managed to raise $800m 
from capital markets to refinance part of its debt.
Given the intensity of ties between politics and business, some investments 
can be understood as an attempt by private businesses to gain protection 
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from political hazard (Vahtra and Liutho, 2004). Firstly, acquiring foreign 
assets enables the firms to protect part of their capital. Secondly, increa-
sing upstream or downstream control of the international value chain 
puts their Russian assets into an integrated production network that limits 
the relevance of an eventual expropriation in Russia. From the perspec-
tive of the Global Production Networks approach, it may be interpreted as 
an attempt to relax constraints deriving from territorial embeddedness 
through more intense embeddedness in global networks.
5. THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONALIZATION
The 2008-2009 global downturn shows the limits and the risks of the 
foreign-led expansion of Russian firms and its deleterious consequences 
for the Russian economy as a whole. The economic crisis has struck Russian 
metallurgical firms violently, with a sharp fall in operating revenue in 
the first half of 2009 (Figure 3). As metal prices fell sharply (Figure 2) 
and global demand collapsed, major companies were running for cash and 
had to apply for rescue loans from the State bank VEB to refinance their 
Western loans and to cope with increasing debts of their customers. Such 
change has led to intense talks on the restructuring of the sector under 
the supervision of the government and its agencies.
The crisis has not only deteriorated the financial position of the firms. 
Between January and December 2008, production of crude steel fell by 
50 % and firms like Severstal, NLMK and MMK had idled blast furnaces. 
The fall in demand was less severe in the aluminium industry, but Rusal 
has also announced plans to cut output. Moreover, firms have severely 
reduced wages, through the cancellation of bonuses, reduced working-
time and some limited lay-offs. Finally, the consequences for regions of 
production are dramatic, as many firms are located in mono-industrial 
towns and they are the main contributors to local government budgets.
Beyond the crisis, the record of this sequence of international expansion 
from the point of view of national development is highly debatable. There 
is no doubt that, for the owners, it has been very beneficial. The ROE of the 
major firms was between 23 % and 57 % in 2005, 2006 and 2007. Incredible 
returns of up to 107 % were attained in 2004 (Figure 11). As far as Rusal 
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is concerned, financial data are not available but, according to the press, 
Deripaska appears to have withdrawn at least $10 billion in proceeds out 
of Rusal since 2001. On average, the wealth of the main shareholders of 
these firms increased fourfold between 2004 and 2008, leaving no doubt 
about how favorable this sequence had been for them; however, they were 
hit very hard by the crisis and their estimated aggregate wealth signifi-
cantly fell between 2008 and 2012 (Table 1).
However, as far as Russian industrial development is concerned, the 
2000’s have seen an increase in the dependency of the country on imports 
of manufactured and specific metallurgical products (Budanov, 2008). 
This confirms that Russian metallurgy is still specialized in basic ferrous 
metal products and is not able to provide the inputs the Russian machine 
industry needs. There is some reliance on imports in the nickel business as 
well, whereas Norilsk is the leading producer in the world. In this case it 
is due to tax evasion chains and bribery mechanisms. These facts suggest 
that the huge resources of the golden years of the Russian metallurgists 
were used to expand the wealth of the owners of the firms instead of fun-
ding the development of the industry notably downstream. A comparative 
outlook confirms a tremendous gap between the weakness of the domes-
tic investment and the growth of foreign operations: in 2007, the ratio FDI 
outward stock / Gross fixed capital formation was 6,8 % for China, 11,9 % 
for India, 55,9 % for Brazil but 136,4 % for Russia (UNCTAD FDIstat, 2010).
Overall, the foreign expansion of metallurgical firms should have contri-
buted to some industrial upgrading process. Nonetheless, the above state-
ments challenge the assertion of Liuhto and Vahtra (2007, p. 137-138) that 
“the outward expansion of foreign firms is essential for both individual 
companies and the Russian economy as a whole” and that it should be 
encouraged by government policies.
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Figure 9. Return on equity for main metallurgical firms (2002-2007)
Source: The authors based on Osiris database and companies’ reports.
6. CONCLUSION
This article has described the extent of the internationalization of the 
Russian metallurgical firms and the main steps of the process since the 
early nineties. The speed and the scope of the foreign expansion of the 
Russian metallurgy has given us the opportunity to discuss the avai-
lable conceptual tools explaining FDI in the light of original stylized facts 
which led us to suggest an exploratory institutional and systemic theore-
tical framework.
This framework has allowed us to inter-relate three kinds of determinants 
of the foreign expansion of Russian metallurgical companies. Firstly, 
foreign expansion is a path-dependent trajectory of company growth 
based on the availability of resources. One important feature here is that 
the initial shift to internationalization by metallurgists occurred during 
the nineties through the development of exports. Thus, foreign expan-
sion is rooted in the initial conditions of the systemic transformation. 
After a phase dominated by internal consolidation and stabilization of 
property rights, the highly favorable business situation since 2002 has 
played a major role, enabling metallurgists to finance foreign internatio-
nal investment.
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Secondly, foreign expansion is a response to a set of macro/meso economic 
and institutional constraints and opportunities. The initial step towards 
internationalization is to be found in the surge of transaction costs in 
the internal market and the drop in national demand during the nine-
ties. Foreign expansion then arose as a new stage of international deve-
lopment, as firms sought to secure their market access and supply chains. 
However, we observe very different features in the ferrous and non-fer-
rous metallurgy sectors, depending on global value-chain specificities and 
in response to international competitive pressure. In the first sector, the 
international expansion is mainly downstream and in developed mar-
kets; in the second sector, foreign investments are mainly upstream and 
in peripheral countries.
Thirdly, foreign acquisitions result from microeconomic strategies rela-
ted to advantage-seeking behavior, improving the position of the firm in 
relation to its competitors by acquiring market power and/or techno-com-
petitive advantages. Within this third block of mechanisms, interaction 
with the political authorities has been specifically discussed. In the cur-
rent Russian context, we have stressed the complex intertwining of auto-
nomy-seeking behavior on the part of company owners and the strong 
dependence of these same owners on their political connections not only 
for foreign expansion and for the stability of their property rights and the 
capital-labor nexus, but also, during the first turbulences of the global cri-
sis, for their financial survival.
This research confirms the relevance of key contributions to the theore-
tical literature on firms and transnationals. In particular, we have relied 
extensively on the Penrosean perspective on the growth of the firm and 
on the influential OLI paradigm to build the microeconomic foundations 
of our institutional and systemic approach. However, moving at a more 
aggregate level, we have pointed out the limits of the IDP which does not 
allow understanding idiosyncratic FDI patterns of developing countries, 
such as Russia’s, and does insufficiently takes into account the impor-
tance of the international rules governing the economy as a key dri-
ver of FDI behaviors. We have not discussed here in a systematic man-
ner the literature on the growth of non-triadic transnationals, but our 
work raised some arguments relevant in this area. First, within the limi-
tations inherent to a sectoral study, the internationalization of Russian 
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metallurgists corroborate the assumption of a progressive pattern, where 
transnationals from developing countries emerge primarily in mature 
industries and less knowledge intensive sectors. In return, the role of “ins-
titutional affinity” do not appear as the main driver of firms FDI beha-
vior, lagging behind determinants linked to the competition regime wit-
hin the industry. However, this factor has played a role as far as the M&A 
in the ex-soviet countries were concerned.
Finally, should we consider that the race towards internationalization 
among Russian metallurgical firms happened too early and too fast? The 
violence of the 2008-09 economic shock for Russian Metallurgists suggests 
that their internationalization has not reduced their economic vulnerabi-
lity. Moreover, there is in our case study no obvious positive relationship 
between the surge of outward FDI and economic or social development. 
Thus, in term of efficiency and sustainability, both at the micro and macro 
levels, evidence suggests a positive answer. I particular, evidence from 
business reports show that productivity in the steel industry has risen 
sharply since 1997 but almost entirely on the back of higher capacity utili-
zation, not improved efficiency. In 2007, labor productivity in Russia was 
just 33 % of labor productivity in the US (McKinsey, 2009) which suggests 
that foreign expansion has, to some extent, been made at the expense of 
domestic investments to boost Russian plants performances.
However, much research remains to be done. The analysis should conti-
nue on this subject in in-depth analysis on the institutional framework 
and its evolution in time and differences in regions. Moreover, this case 
study needs to be compared to with other researches on the emergence of 
transnationals from peripheral countries. It may be useful to discuss the 
possibility of common patterns among the transnationals that have emer-
ged during the commodity boom. Another key point concerns the impact 
of these transnationals on receiving economies. In particular, the ques-
tion needs to be examined of whether there will be further retreat of the 
transnationals from developed countries, which could feed de-industriali-
zation trends. Finally, the case of the Russian metallurgical firms shows 
the importance of the geo-economic consequences of a surge in natural 
resources prices. It suggests to considerate accurately the consequences of 
a comeback of the classical rent issue at a global scale, should the medium 
term prospects of a shortage of natural resources for key raw materials 
materialize.
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